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Abstract— Thanks to recent advances in robotics, sensors
and wireless communications, it is feasible to develop a
variety of new architectures for Mobile Wireless Sensor
Networks (MWSNs) that play an important role in var-
ious applications such as battlefield surveillance, harbor
monitoring, etc. However, due to the dynamic of mobile
network topology in MWSNs, many new security challenges
have emerged. In this article, we give a survey on the state
of the art technologies in security aspects of MWSNs. We
review existing work that provides security in MWSNs, with
an emphasis on data survival, forward secrecy, backward
secrecy, authentication, and methods for sensor capture
detection. Furthermore, in order to stimulate the exploration
of new research areas, we point out a few open research
topics that can be further pursued, and also shed light on
these topics.
Index Terms— Security; Mobile Wireless Sensor Network;
Wireless Sensor Network
I. INTRODUCTION
In recent years, Wireless Sensor Networks (WSNs)
have been an extremely popular research area [1]. A WSN
usually consists of a large number of different types of
sensors that are able to monitor a wide variety of ambient
conditions such as temperature, humidity, vehicular move-
ment, pressure, noise levels, etc. The low cost of sensors
makes it possible to deploy a large number of them to
perform both military and civilian applications. However,
the low cost of sensors also leads to severe resource
constraints such as limited battery power, memory and
low computation capability, and these constraints in turn
introduce major obstacles to the implementation of tradi-
tional computer security approaches (such as public key
cryptography) in a WSN. Moreover, the open nature and
unattended operation of WSNs make the security defenses
even more difficult. Because of these, WSN security
issues, such as key management, message authentication,
intrusion detection, etc. [2]–[4], have recently gained a lot
of attention.
However, despite the static network topology, the tra-
ditional WSNs suffer from the following drawbacks:
• Near-Sink sensors drain their energy faster than other
sensors in the network because these sensors need to
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not only deliver their own data to the sink but also
forward data originating from many other sensors
(located farther away) towards the sink. As a conse-
quence, the near-sink sensors could rapidly deplete
their energy and then totally lose their functions.
• Near-Sink sensors would attract more attacks than
other sensors do because if enough near-sink sensors
are compromised or lose function, sink reachability
would be compromised.
• In human being hostile areas, such as battle fields,
volcanic areas, underwater zones, etc., sensors are
usually deployed by airplanes or helicopters, creating
the predicament of imprecise sensor location and
coverage uncertainty.
• Moreover, in the abovementioned areas, it may not
be feasible to deploy a fixed sink (or base station).
Additionally, we observe that in a large extent of
existing WSN security literature (especially in the early
research stage), it is assumed that sensors are both static
and able to transmit sensed data at will (or anticipate
an upload signal) to a trusted party, called a sink or
base station, inside the network. However, this is not
the case for all real-world WSN applications, for ex-
ample in certain areas, such as the ocean surface [5]
(sensors or sinks are mobile due to water current and
wave conditions), underwater [6] (sensors or sinks are
mobile because of the water current), patient monitoring
[7] and wildlife monitoring [8] (sensors are mobile due
to their attachment to patient or alive, moving animals).
These new applications therefore require a new network
topology in which either sinks or sensors are mobile
or both of them are mobile. Thanks to the advances in
robotics, it is possible to develop a variety of mobile
nodes [9] to form a new type of WSNs known as Mobile
Wireless Sensor Networks (MWSNs). In MWSNs, mobile
nodes (essentially small robots with sensing, wireless
communications, and mobility capabilities) are useful for
applications such as adaptive sampling, improving net-
work connectivity of static sensor deployment and event
detection. In contrast to conventional static WSNs, targets
that might never have been detected in a static WSN
can now be detected by mobile sensors/sinks [10] due to
sensors’ (or sink’s) mobility. Finally, mobility enables us
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to solve network connectivity problems caused by sensor
failure or battery depletion. In brief, MWSNs differ from
WSN in a way that the network topology of MWSNs is
dynamic.
Nevertheless, the unique properties of MWSNs pose
many new challenges in security. Due to dynamic mobile
network topology, security in MWSNs becomes more
complicated. Thus, more exploratory studies are required
with regard to the security issues involved. Aiming
at providing deeper understanding of current security
schemes in MWSNs, we provide in this paper a survey
of the existing work in MWSN security that has been
proposed in recent years, including a classification for
these schemes. Furthermore, in certain topics such as
location privacy and authentication, due to an absence
of literature addressing security mechanisms in MWSNs,
some classic schemes in traditional WSNs are addressed.
In order to give a clue on this new research direction,
we further highlight a few open questions that need be
addressed, together with our suggestions on these topics.
It is worth mentioning that this article does not focus on
the common security issues of either traditional WSNs or
MWSNs, but rather specifically addresses newly arisen
issues due to the dynamic mobile network topology of
MWSNs. Readers interested in common security issues of
traditional WSNs and MWSNs may refer to a few existing
surveys on security issues in WSNs [2], [3], [11].
In the remainder of the article, we discuss a number
of security challenges unique to MWSNs. In Section II,
we summarize the network architecture of MWSNs. The
outline of the threat to models of MWSNs is addressed
in Section III. The security requirements of MWSNs are
listed in Section IV. In Section V, we review the existing
schemes on MWSNs. A few new research directions in
MWSNs are pointed out in Section VI. Finally, we offer
a conclusion in Section VII.
II. NETWORK ARCHITECTURE
In this section, we classify the network architectures of
MWSNs into three-categories: static sensor nodes with
mobile sink, static sink with mobile sensor nodes, and
situations in which both sensors and sinks are mobile.
A. Static Sensor Nodes with Mobile Sink
A MWSN may consist of a large number of static
sensors and a mobile collector (sink or base station).
After data collection, the sensors store the data locally
till the mobile sink visits the network to collect data. For
instance, static sensors deployed in a volcanic area are
responsible for collecting parameters of volcano activities.
A mobile sink (e.g. a helicopter) periodically visits the
network to collect the sampled data.
B. Static Sink with Mobile Sensor Nodes
In contrast, there exists another network topology in
which the sink is static while sensors are mobile. Con-
sider, for example, a scenario in which zoologists are in-
terested in monitoring animals’ activities and their health
status in their natural habitat. They attach sensor devices
to animals and then let them roam freely. The sensors thus
move with the animals anytime and anywhere, whereas
the sinks (or base stations) are deployed in the places
where the animals visit frequently, such as water sources
for drinking, caves for sleeping, or trees for enjoying the
shade. When the sensors attached to the animals generate
data, they cannot transmit the data to the sink at will
unless they are within the transmission range of a sink.
The data generated needs to be stored locally until the
animals visit the regions covered by the sinks, and then
the sensors attached to the animals can upload data to the
sink.
C. Both Sink and Sensor Nodes are Mobile
Besides the aforementioned two MWSN topologies,
yet another network topology is that both sink and sen-
sor nodes are mobile. For example, a Sensor Equipped
Aquatic (SEA) Swarm [6], consisting of a large number
of underwater sensor nodes air-dropped to the chosen
venue, was deployed to support applications for time
critical applications, such as submarine tracking and har-
bor monitoring. Each node, consisting of various sensors,
a fish-like bladder apparatus and a pressure gauge, can
dynamically control the depths using the bladders and
on-board pressure gauges [12]. As shown in Fig. 1, a
SEA Swarm is deployed in a square region, operating
and moving as swarm with the water current, searching
for invasive submarine or scouting the waters around
harbors or underwater mining facilities. A few unmanned
submarines may act as mobile sinks to receive alert
messages from sensor nodes.
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Figure 1. An example of a SEA Swarm: mobile nodes detect events
and report them to corresponding mobile sinks.
As discussed above, all these three network topologies
of MWSNs have the common property that sensors must
be able to store sensed data in their memories until
meeting with sinks to upload their data.
III. THREAT MODEL
Due to the fact that sinks (or base stations ) are not
always present in MWSNs, new security threats emerge.
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In this section, we focus on these new challenges which
are unique in MWSNs. While we focus more on attacks in
MWSNs, interested readers are referred to [11], [13] for
more in-depth information on common attacks in WSNs.
A. Outsider Attacks
Because of the open nature of wireless communica-
tions, unauthorized participants of the network are able to
eavesdrop on the radio frequency of MWSNs. For exam-
ple, in a battlefield application, sensors are used to sense
noise, vibration and light caused by troop movement. An
adversary can alter or spoof packets to induce inaccurate
analysis results based on the bogus sensed data.
Another outsider attack is to disable the function of
sensor nodes. By doing so, an adversary can launch
Denial of Service (DoS) attack or inject useless packets to
drain the resource of receivers. Moreover, the adversary
may physically corrupt sensors (such as smash, melt or
corrode them); consequently, the sensors totally lose their
functionality.
B. Insider Attacks
Insider attacks happen when authorized sensors of
MWSNs behave in unintended or unauthorized ways.
When sensors are captured by an adversary, it can re-
programme the sensor and hold the secret key. With the
compromised sensor, the adversary can perform insider
attacks such as generating bogus data, seeking to steal
secrets from the network and disrupting its normal func-
tioning.
C. Mobile Adversary
In MWSNs, sensors cannot transmit sensed data to a
sink at will because the sink is not always present (i.e., a
mobile sink periodically visits the static sensors to collect
data; mobile sensors visit static sinks to offload data; or
mobile sinks and mobile sensors meet and communicate
uncertainly). The data accumulated in their memories thus
become targets of various adversaries.
The authors in [14] propose a mobile adversary model
where a mobile adversary visits and travels around the
network, trying to compromise a subset (up to a certain
size) of sensors within the time interval while sinks
are not present in the network. (We will hereafter refer
to the mobile adversary as ADV .) The time an ADV
compromises a set of sensors is much shorter than the
time between two successive data collections of a sink.
As a consequence, given enough compromise intervals,
such an ADV can gradually subvert the entire network.
The authors in [15] further extend and divide an ADV
into three categories as follows:
• Read-only ADV: ADV aims to learn as much sensed
data as possible. Until now, it was not difficult to read
data from the memories of commodity sensors [16].
Therefore, with no countermeasures, an ADV can
compromise sensors and read the data accumulated
in their memory directly.
• Search-and-erase ADV: ADV tries to prevent cer-
tain target data from reaching the sink. For example,
in a nuclear emission monitoring application, sink
will raise the alarm if one of the sensing nodes
reports a value above a pre-specified threshold. ADV
thus aims to find that value and erase it before it
ever reaches the sink. ADV might be undetected if
the sink tolerates some missing measurements (due
to occasional errors or malfunctions).
• Search-and-replace ADV: If the sink has no toler-
ance for lost data, ADV changes its strategy from
search-and-erase to search-and-replace, in the sense
that ADV replaces the target data with a value within
the threshold.
D. Node Failure or misbehavior
Unlike traditional WSNs, sensors in MWSNs should
be able to store data in their memories till meeting a
sink to offload the data. As a consequence, if the sensor
node fails or operates incorrectly, all the accumulated
data will be lost. Thus, the impacts of node failure in
MWSNs are more serious than in traditional WSNs. Node
failure can be caused by several reasons such as node
compromise, battery depletion and physical damage (i.e.,
natural disaster or being smashed by an attacker).
IV. SECURITY REQUIREMENTS
In this section, we introduce security requirements
which need to be met in MWSNs.
• Confidentiality: Due to the open nature of MWSNs,
confidentiality is necessary to enable sensors to
protect data from eavesdroppers. For example, a
message should be understood by desired recipients
rather than attackers. The standard solution to keep
sensitive data secret is to encrypt the data with a se-
cret key known only by the desired recipients. Since
public key cryptography is too resource demanding
for commodity sensors, one can use symmetric key
encryption (e.g., Data Encryption Standard (DES)
and Advanced Encryption Standard (AES)) and a
shared secret key between the communicating parties
to achieve confidentiality.
• Integrity: Ensuring the integrity of sensed data is
important for preventing data from being modified
by attackers. Unlike confidentiality, integrity is, in
most cases, a mandatory property. Upon receiving a
message from a sensor, the sink wants to ensure that
the received message is exactly the same as that is
sent by the sensor (i.e., it contains no modifications,
insertions, deletions, or replays).
• Authentication: Authentication defines the security
requirement that any sensor node can ensure the
identity of the peer node with which it is commu-
nicating [17]. Since communication between sensor
nodes is based on wireless communication medium,
sensor nodes should be able to detect maliciously
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injected or spoofed packets. In addition, data in-
tegrity and sensor authentication are essential secu-
rity requirements in most sensor applications [2]. An
attacker might modify and delete data generated by
sensors. Data generated by sensors thus have to be
authenticated before they are accepted as valid data
and are used for whatever purposes. To provide data
authentication, common approaches are Message
Authentication Codes (MACs) or digital signatures,
which are usually used in the applications where data
authentication and data integrity are needed.
• Access control: Ensuring that only authorized users
can access the network resource (i.e., the policy
controls which can access a resource, under what
conditions access can occur, and what those accesses
to resources are allowed to do).
• Availability: Providing availability requires that a
MWSN is always accessible throughout its lifetime.
A common way to compromise network availability
is DoS attack that involves saturating the network
with external communication requests so that it can-
not respond to legitimate traffic. In addition, sensor
failure caused by battery depletion or hardware error
can also compromise availability. In practice, loss of
availability may have serious impacts. For instance,
during battlefield surveillance, a compromising of
availability may open a back door for enemy inva-
sion.
• Forward Secrecy: Ensuring forward secrecy requires
that an ADV should not be able to read any previ-
ously transmitted message.
• Backward Secrecy: Providing backward secrecy re-
quires that an ADV should not be able to read future
messages after it leaves the MWSNs.
• Auditing: Ensuring auditing requires that sensors of
MWSNs should have the ability to store any signif-
icant events that occur inside the network. Auditing
is necessary because of the autonomous nature of
the sensors. In some scenarios, sink (or base station)
will not always be available, so sensors should be
able to store the sensed data till a mobile sink visits
the network to retrieve the data.
• Non-repudiation: Providing non-repudiation requires
protection against denial by one of the communica-
tion parties. More specifically, a node (or sink) can-
not deny sending the message it has previously sent.
A common method of providing non-repudiation
is to produce certain evidence to prove that the
communication party has performed a task.
• Privacy and Anonymity: Providing privacy and
anonymity is very important. In some scenarios,
identities and locations of sensors and sink (or base
station) should be protected or hidden. For example,
when considering battlefield surveillance, soldiers
equipped with mobile sinks, which can be used
to access the network to obtain information about
enemy activities, will be in danger if their locations
are revealed.
V. OVERVIEW OF EXISTING SECURITY MECHANISMS
In this section, we introduce our taxonomy of security
mechanisms for MWSNs. As shown in Table I, we clas-
sify and review the existing work on security of MWSNs
based on security requirements of MWSNs. Generally
speaking, there are more security requirements needed
in MWSNs (as discussed in Section IV). However, since
security requirements (integrity, availability, etc.) are also
common requirements in WSNs, existing work [2], [3],
[11] proposed for them can be used in MWSNs as well.
Here, we discuss security issues unique to MWSNs that
arise due to their dynamic network topology. In addition,
due to an absence of literature addressing certain areas
of security mechanisms, we also introduce some classic
schemes in traditional WSNs as an alternative.
TABLE I.
TAXONOMY OF SECURITY MECHANISMS FOR MWSNS.
Issues Publications
Secrecy [18]–[20]
Data Survival [14], [21], [22]
Authentication [23], [24]
Access Control [25]–[27]
Access Privacy [27]
Data Source Location Privacy [28]–[30]
Sink Location Privacy [31], [32]
Key Management [33], [34]
Intrusion Detection [35], [36]
Intrusion Resilience [37], [38]
A. Secrecy (Countermeasures against Read-only ADV)
To solve the security issues arising due to read-only
ADV , we have to guarantee both forward secrecy and
backward secrecy. As shown in Fig. 2, let us assume
that an ADV compromises a sensor node si at round
r1, and releases the si at round r2(r1 < r2). Between
round r1 and r2, the ADV is residing in si, and we define
this time interval as reside period Trp. Thus, the forward
secrecy is secrecy of data generated before round r1. The
forward secrecy of a sensor si is compromised if the data
generated and encrypted before round r1 can be decrypted
by an ADV which holds the secret obtained during reside
period Trp. In contrast, backward secrecy is about secrecy
of data generated after round r2. The backward secrecy
of a sensor si is compromised if the data generated and
encrypted after round r2 can be decrypted by an ADV
which holds a secret obtained during reside period Trp.
Existing schemes in cryptography were proposed to
achieve either forward secrecy [39], [40] only or both
forward secrecy and backward secrecy [41]–[44]. Key
evolution is a common approach in all of these schemes
to provide forward secrecy. Its basic idea is that secret key
Ki is updated by applying hash function at each round,
e.g., Kri = h(Kr−1i ) (r ≥ 1 andK0i = Ki). Because
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Figure 2. A node is compromised by ADV at round r1, released at
round r2, and at round r3 the ADV returns again.
of the one-way property of hash function, deriving the
previous rounds key (pre-compromised) based on current
round key is impossible.
However, the aforementioned public cryptography ap-
proaches [41]–[44] are not suitable for MWSNs because
sensor nodes use only the public key of the sink to
encrypt data. The private key evolved at each round is
kept in the mobile sink which is assumed to be a trusted
party, whereas sensors are usually considered as source
constrained devices that cannot afford for public key
cryptography. Therefore, symmetric key-based schemes
are needed. In the rest of this subsection, we summarize
two popular schemes designed specifically for MWSNs.
DIstributed Self-Healing (DISH) [18]. In DISH, the
authors first define a mobile adversary that has compro-
mising capability k, meaning that the mobile adversary
can compromise up to k nodes during the time interval
T while the mobile sink is not available. Three states of
sensors are defined (called healthy, sick, and occupied) in
DISH. At the initial stage, all sensors are healthy, in the
sense that ADV has no information about their data and
secret keys. As soon as the mobile sink collects data and
leaves the network, the ADV starts to compromise sen-
sors. A sensor is occupied if it is currently compromised.
Once the sensor is compromised, the ADV can access the
local memory and learn the secret key. The sensors are
sick if the sensors have been previously compromised,
and the ADV can still compute the current secret keys
based on the keys acquired when it occupied them, even
if it no longer does so.
The basic requirement of DISH is that unattended
sensors attempt to recover from sick states and maintain
both forward and backward secrecy of the collected data.
In DISH, forward secrecy is provided through key evolu-
tion. However, DISH does not guarantee absolutely back-
ward secrecy. Instead, it provides probabilistic backward
secrecy, a state which depends on conditions such as:
compromising capability of the mobile adversary (number
of nodes it can compromise at a given time interval T ),
and for how long time the mobile sink successively visits
the network.
The main idea of DISH is to let healthy sensors heal
sick sensors. As shown in Fig. 3, sensor A receives
contribution r from its neighbors B, C and D, which is a
random number generated by its corresponding neighbors,
and then uses the contributions along with its current key
as input to a one-way hash function to compute its next
round key. If at least one of the sensors B, C, D is healthy
(in the sense that at least one of the contributions rB ,
rC , rD is unknown to the ADV), the ADV is unable
to learn the newly generated key. Here, the contribution
is a pseudo-random value. As a consequence, sensor A
is healed, and its state transfer from sick to healthy. We
claim that DISH can provide probabilistic backward se-
crecy because if all its neighbors are sick, sensor A cannot
become healthy. Fig. 4 further shows the states transition
of sensors. With the sensor cooperation approach, healthy
sensors always remain healthy as long as they are not
directly compromised, whereas sick sensors can become
healthy if at least one of their received contributions is
from healthy peers.
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Figure 3. An example of DISH.
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Figure 4. DISH sensor states transition diagram.
Proactive co-Operative Self-Healing (POSH) [19].
Compared with DISH [18], the basic idea of self-healing
in POSH is the same, which causes sick sensors receiv-
ing random contributions from healthy peers to become
healthy again. The difference is that the DISH scheme is
referred to as a pull model because sensors request con-
tributions from peers; on the contrary, the POSH scheme
is referred to as a push model that involves sponsors
volunteering their contributions. In other words, in the
push model, sensors send their contributions to t randomly
selected neighbors without receiving any requests.
POSH improves DISH in the following significant man-
ner: the POSH scheme can guarantee better probabilistic
backward secrecy than the DISH scheme. In the DISH
scheme, ADV knows the peers from which each sick
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sensor has asked for a contribution. For example, as
shown in Fig. 3, sensor A requests contributions from its
neighbors B, C, and D. If sensor A is sick, meaning that
it was compromised before, the ADV knows its previous
key Kr1 and the set of sensor A’s future sponsors. The
ADV can then compromise all the sponsors in the set
and acquire their contributions to sensor A, which allows
ADV to compute the new key. However, in the POSH
scheme, the sponsors randomly select t neighbors to send
contributions. As a consequence, if a sponsor is healthy,
ADV cannot determine for certain the set of sensors it
might contribute to, meaning that the ADV cannot know
all the sponsors who sponsor the contributions to sensor
A’s new key. Moreover, the POSH scheme requires only
half of the message required in the DISH scheme because
DISH needs two messages - a request and a reply - for
each contribution.
More recent work [20] utilizes (m,n) Reed-Solomon
(RS) coding to improve data reliability and backward
secrecy. Sensors take advantage of (m,n) RS codes to
divide data into n parts and then send parts of their data
to their neighbors, where m of n (m < n) data parts
are required to reconstruct data, adding data redundancy
to provide resilience to node invalidation and Byzantine
failure. Data can be recovered if less than n − m data
parts are compromised. Since data parts are distributed
among sensor’s neighbors, backward secrecy of si can be
compromised if and only if
1) si is compromised by the mobile adversary.
2) The mobile adversary’s compromising ability is θ >
m.
3) The mobile adversary has compromised at least m
neighbor nodes of si that store the corresponding
data parts.
Our scheme in [20] makes an obstacle that forces
the mobile adversary to compromise more sensors to
compromise si’s backward secrecy. Assuming that Pi
is the probability that si can be compromised by the
mobile adversary, and that Pi,j is the probability that
si,j , a neighbor node of si, is compromised, it is easy to
understand that the backward secrecy of si is improved
due to the fact
PiΠ
m
j=1Pi,j < Pi .
Pi,j is usually different for different nodes and could be
evaluated from the feedback of certain security monitor-
ing software and/or assigned manually by the mobile sink
based on information such as the physical protection, the
location, or the role of the nodes. We further improved the
scheme [20] by selecting the top m security level nodes,
e.g., m pairs with the lowest Pi,j to decrease PiΠmj=1Pi,j .
B. Data Survival (Countermeasures against Search-and-
Erase ADV)
Let us consider a scenario where a network of nuclear
emission sensors are deployed in a recalcitrant country
(under an international treaty) in order to monitor any
potential nuclear activity [14]. If one of the sensors senses
a value above a certain threshold, the sink can raise
an alarm to report the emission. An adversary might
want to find that value and erase it before it reaches
the sink. This adversary, as discussed in Section III-C, is
called Search-and-Erase ADV . If the network can tolerate
some missing measurements (due to message failure or
lost communication), the Search-and-Erase ADV remains
undetected even if it succeeds.
In [14], later extended in [21], the authors target
a Search-and-Erase ADV to propose countermeasures.
Recall that the main threat of a Search-and-Erase ADV
is to prevent certain target data from reaching the sink.
In other words, the idea of countermeasure can be simply
described as how to keep the certain target data survival.
Based on the idea described above, [14] proposed three
data survival strategies: DO-NOTHING, MOVE-ONCE,
and KEEP-MOVING.
• DO-NOTHING. In this strategy, sensors do nothing
about their sensed data. That is sensors just simply
leave the data to reside in the sensor that collected
it and wait for the sink. In this case, the Search-and-
Erase ADV can find the target sensor quickly and
erase the target data.
• MOVE-ONCE. In this strategy, sensors move their
data once and only once right after their data collec-
tion. The data will stay in their new home until the
next sink visits.
• KEEP-MOVING. Sensors move data continuously,
i.e., at each round, each sensor re-allocates the data
to another randomly selected sensor.
To analyze data survival probability, the authors have
further proposed three attack strategies of the Search-and-
Erase ADV as follows:
• LAZY. The ADV is LAZY in the sense that the
ADV satisfies with its current compromised k sen-
sors, and does not want to further compromise other
k sensors.
• FRANTIC. It is only in extreme cases that ADV
compromises k randomly selected sensors at each
round.
• SMART. ADV first selects two sets of sensors, each
of size k, and then simply alternates control between
these two sets at each round.
At the first glance, we may have the impression that
DO-NOTHING is the worst choice listed above, and
KEEP-MOVING is the best one to keep target data
survival since it is more difficult for ADV to catch the
target data if it is moving continuously. However, this sup-
position is not true. After completing a detailed analysis
comparing the survival strategies of target data and attack
strategies of ADV , the authors have produced the analysis
results (as shown in Table II). It is surprising that DO-
NOTHING is the best choice if ADV’s attack strategy
is LAZY and SMART. For the ADV , a “NO” label in a
table cell implies that the corresponding combination of
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data survival and attack strategies is not sensible, whereas
a “YES” label means that the corresponding combination
is viable.
TABLE II.
VIABILITY OF SURVIVAL AND ATTACK STRATEGIES [14].
Attack Strategy
Survival Strategy LAZY FRANTIC SMART
DO-NOTHING NO YES NO
MOVE ONCE NO YES NO
KEEP MOVING YES YES YES
Although sensors may play a hide-and-seek game by
moving all data around the network [14], [21], [22],
this is ultimately a losing game, unless cryptography is
used [22]. The authors in [22] apply cryptography in
the context of data survival in unattended WSNs. By
comparing with symmetric encryption and public key
encryption, the result shows that simple cryptographic
schemes coupled with data mobility strategies can be of
great help in providing data survival, and demonstrates
that there is no security advantage in using public key
(over symmetric) cryptography.
C. Authentication (Countermeasures against Search-and-
Replace ADV)
In traditional WSNs, schemes [45]–[48] were proposed
to provide data (sensor) authentication. However asym-
metric cryptographic mechanisms are too costly for re-
source constrained sensor networks. To address this prob-
lem, the authors in [45] proposed the µTESLA protocol
that introduces asymmetry through a delayed disclosure
of symmetric keys and one-way function key chains,
resulting in an efficient broadcast authentication scheme.
In [46] authors improved the µTESLA key distribution
efficiency by using predetermined and broadcast initial
parameters of the µTESLA instead of unicast-based initial
key chain distribution, thus the requirement of unicast-
based initial communication between sensor nodes and
base station to save communication overhead in large-
scale WSNs is removed. This is because if a node wants to
broadcast information in the µTESLA, it must first firstly
send the information to the base station, and then the
base station broadcasts the information. This procedure
causes in turn a great deal of communication overhead
between base station and sensor nodes and is not suitable
for local broadcast authentication. The authors in [48],
[49] have proposed an efficient protocol for providing
local broadcast authentication based on the use of one-
way key chains to solve the problems in the µTESLA. To
prevent false data injection attacks in WSNs, the authors
in [47] enable the base station to verify authenticity of
a received report as long as the number of compromised
nodes is fewer than a certain threshold value.
However, the schemes mentioned above are not suitable
for MWSNs since sink (or base station) is not always
present in this case. Furthermore, due to the absence
of real-time communication between sensors and sinks,
sensors are forced to accumulate data along with their
authentication information till the next visit of a mobile
sink to offload the data. The authentication information
per data is not a storage issue in traditional WSNs be-
cause sensors can send data alone with the authentication
information to a base station either at will or at brief
intervals, which would not cause much storage overhead,
whereas in MWSNs, computing authentication tags per
sensed unit of data may cause high storage overhead, and
the cost increases along with the mobile sink visiting time
interval. Moreover, in order to provide reasonable security
requirements, a minimum number like 128 bits per MAC
(or 320 bits per signature) is needed. Consequently, the
size of the authentication tag may easily exceed the size
of sensed data. Thus, how to solve the storage overhead
of authentication accumulated tag is a challenging task
in MWSNs. In addition, if a sensor is compromised, its
secret key used for MACs or signatures is exposed as
well. An ADV holding a secret key can easily produce
falsely sensed data after the compromise, and also produce
fraudulent data before the compromise, if the data has not
been off-loaded to a sink. Therefore, another issue is how
to provide forward secrecy.
To reduce the storage overhead of authentication tags
as well as provide data (or sensor) authentication and for-
ward secrecy, the authors in [23] explore Forward secure
sequential Aggregate (FssAgg) authentication schemes
[50]–[53] to construct an FssAgg-MAC scheme and an
FssAgg-signature scheme, which allows a signer to com-
bine multiple authentication tags generated in different
key/time periods into a single constant-size tag. Conse-
quently, the storage overhead of accumulated authenti-
cation tags is reduced significantly. However, although
computational efficiency is achieved through hash chains
and symmetric key distribution, FssAgg-MAC still re-
quires high storage overhead, and its signature cannot be
publicly verified.
To achieve computational efficiency, forward secrecy
and public verifiability, the authors in [24] proposed a
new class of digital signature schemes for MWSNs, which
is called Hash-based Sequential Aggregate and Forward
Secure Signatures (HaSAFSS) by introducing asymmetry
between the senders (sensors) and receivers (mobile sinks)
with the aid of Timed-Release Encryption (TRE) [54].
The property of TRE is to encrypt data that no party in-
cluding the intended receivers (mobile sinks) can decrypt
it until a predefined future time. Thus, even if the sender
(sensor) is compromised, such property can still provide
forward secrecy and aggregate signature in a publicly ver-
ifiable way. Based on the difference of keys (time trapdoor
key, per-interval key and per-data item key) generation,
HaSAFSS can be further classified into two schemes,
a symmetric HaSAFSS scheme (Sym-HaSAFSS) and
an Elliptic Curve Cryptography (ECC)-based HaSAFSS
scheme. Sym-HaSAFSS and ECC-HaSAFSS are comple-
mentary to each other with respect to storage overhead
of computing these keys. In Sym-HaSAFSS, each sender
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(sensor) initially stores R encrypted keys, which each
receiver (mobile sink) stores only one key. In contrast,
in ECC-HaSAFSS, each sender stores only one key and
the sender can compute its own session keys after the
deployment based on the fact that each receiver stores R
public keys for each sender.
D. Access Control
Access control is defined as the prevention of unautho-
rized use of a resource, including the prevention of use
of a resource in an unauthorized manner [17]. Generally,
the data access strategy of WSNs can be divided into two
ways, namely access control at the base station and access
control at sensor nodes. In traditional WSNs, sensor
nodes transmit generated data to a base station that users
can access by querying through the base station. Access
control strategy is adopted in the base station side rather
than in the sensor nodes. Since the base station is not
constrained by resources (computation, energy, memory,
etc.), many access control policies [55], [56] can be used.
As this paper focuses mainly on MWSNs, we do not
explicitly address the access control strategies of base
stations. In MWSNs, as a large amount of sensed data
are stored in individual sensor nodes, the data storage
and access have to be protected by using encryption, so
that the data can only be accessed by authorized users
with the corresponding keys.
For example, in mission-critical application scenarios
(such as a battlefield), different kinds of sensors generate
different types of sensed data (e.g., smoke, vibration or
noise, etc.), which may be specified to different kinds of
users (e.g., scouts, landmine experts or officers, etc.), or
can be accessed based on the user’s security level. For
example, a general may have a higher privilege to access
data than a soldier does.
To solve the aforementioned problem, related schemes
[25]–[27] have been proposed, and they can be divided
into two categories, namely Symmetric Key Cryptography
(SKC) based schemes [25] and Public Key Cryptography
(PKC) based ones [26], [27].
In the SKC-based schemes, data is encrypted and
decrypted by using the same secret key. This means that if
a sensor is compromised, the ADV can get the secret key
stored in the sensor memory and is thus able to decrypt
the accumulated data generated by the same sensor. To
solve this problem, a naive scheme is to divide the lifetime
of sensors into a series of phases, and the key used for
encrypting the data is updated in each phase. Sensors
merely store the key for the current phase, and erase all
the previous keys securely. Nevertheless, the interaction
may incur high computation overhead. The authors in
[25] have proposed an SKC-based distributed data storage
and retrieval scheme, where the access control policy
is provided by sharing the symmetric secret key with
authorized users based on perturbed polynomial technique
[57]. However, the scheme [25] was proved as not secure
in [58]. Thus, distributed data storage access control
in MWSNs using SKC-based scheme is still an open
question.
Next, in the PKC-based schemes, data is encrypted
by using a public key, and it can only be decrypted
by using the corresponding private key. Thanks to this
advantageous feature of PKC, an attacker is not able to
decrypt the data stored in the sensors even if the sensors
are compromised, since it lacks the corresponding private
keys. In traditional PKC-based schemes, however, data
encrypted using a public key can be only decrypted by
using the corresponding private key, in the sense of a one-
to-one relationship. For instance, the encrypted data using
a general’s public key can only be accessed by the general.
If the data is specified to be accessed by users having
different security levels (e.g., scouts or landmine experts),
the data has to be encrypted by the public keys of the
users, which consequently causes large storage overhead
and computation overhead. To tackle this problem, the
authors in [26] proposed Fine-grained Distributed data
Access Control (FDAC) scheme based on Key-Policy
Attribute-Based Encryption (KP-ABE) [59].
The basic idea of KP-ABE is that ciphertext associates
with a set of attributes, and private key associates with
an access structure. A ciphertext can be decrypted only if
the attributes of the ciphertext satisfy the access structure
of the private key. As shown in Fig. 5, a landmine expert
with the key which has access structure as {(Location is
road) AND (Type is smoke OR vibration) AND (Owner is
landmine expert)} can decrypt ciphertext A with attribute
{location = road, type = vibration, owner = (landmine
expert, scout, general)}, but cannot decrypt ciphertext B
with attribute {location = village, type = smoke, owner =
(scout, general)}.
By using the advantageous property of KP-ABE, in
FDAC, each sensor and its sensed data are associated
with a set of attributes, and each user is assigned with
an access structure which is embedded in its secret key.
The leaf node of the access structure tree is one of the
attributes in the attribute set. It is easy to observe that
the definition of the access structure tree enables one
to represent complex logical expressions, and is able
to specify access privileges of users in a fine-grained
way. Although the authors have tailored and adapted KP-
ABE for WSNs and demonstrate that FDAC is affordable
compared with high-end sensor nodes such as iMote2,
the scheme is still too expensive for normal sensor nodes
because KP-ABE is public key cryptography.
Ciphertext A
Location: road
Type: vibration
Owner: landmine expert, scout,general
Ciphertext B
Location: village
Type: smoke
Owner: scout, general
AND
ORLocation: road
Type: smoke Type: vibration
Owner: landmine expert
Figure 5. A example of access structure in a battlefield scenario.
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E. Access Privacy
In some scenarios (such as ORION [60], NOPP [61]
and IOOS [62]), owners and users of the sensor networks
are different. To compensate for the cost of operating
and maintenance, the owner of a network may enforce
access control that only authorized users can access the
sensed data. In particular, users may want to keep their
privacy when accessing the sensed data in which they are
interested, or from which nodes the data is obtained. For
instance, an oil company interested in the data of an ocean
sensor network [60]–[62] may want to hide its network
regions of interest from both the owner and other users of
the network (who might be potential business competitors
[63]). To guarantee access privacy of network users, the
authors in [63] have proposed target-region mix schemes
such as uniform, randomized and hybrid transformation,
which mix the target-region of the query based on pre-
defined mix functions. The basic idea is to hide the target-
region by mapping the target-region into k regions, such
that the target-region is hided in the k regions where the
owner and other users of the network cannot distinguish
the target-region from the other uninteresting regions.
In the Union Transform (UT), the target-region of
query is transformed into a set of regions. Then, the
set of regions is sent to the based station instead of
the target-region. The base station answers the data of
region in the set. Consequently, it only knows that the
target-region of the user is included in the set, but cannot
distinguish it from other regions. For example, assuming
that R = (R1, R2, · · · , Rk) is a set of regions, the whole
set of regions is sent to the base station to query data if
the user wants to query the data from one region Ri ∈ R.
In the Randomized Transform (RT), the user also
sends a set of regions to the base station, instead of
the target-region. However, the difference is that the set
which consists of regions is selected randomly rather
than pre-defined in UT. The Hybrid Transform (HT) is
a combination of UT and RT.
To the best of our knowledge, [63] is the first publi-
cation that takes into consideration the access privacy of
network users in WSNs. However, the scenarios where
network users query data via one or several base stations
do not exist in MWSNs and thus the scheme proposed in
[63] is not suitable for MWSNs.
The authors in [27] have proposed a Distributed
Privacy-Preserving Access Control (DP 2AC) scheme
that considers a MWSN scenario where the base station
may or may be not available. DP 2AC enables to dis-
connect the mapping between a user’s identity and the
query of the user by using the blind signature [64]. A
user who wants to access the network needs to buy some
tokens from the network owner with blind signatures. If
the user wants to access the network, she needs to send
the pre-purchased tokens to the network for obtaining
the access rights. Let us consider Alice as an example.
After purchasing tokens from the network owner, Alice
can query data from any sensor node, denoted as node
A. When node A receives a token, it first checks whether
the token is valid, then grants the access right to Alice if
it is valid. Moreover, since the validation of the token is
verified by checking the signature of the network owner,
the token can still be checked as a valid token if it is used
before.
To prevent token reuse, the authors in [27] have also
proposed a group of four schemes for Token-Reuse De-
tection (TRD). They begin by describing a network-wide
flooding scheme called Scheme 1 in their paper in which
each node is its own witness and records all the tokens
that have been used by itself or by others. To reduce large
storage overhead, each node has to store a replication
of the used token, and to reduce large communication
overhead caused by flooding, a Randomized Mapping
scheme (called Scheme 2) has been proposed. In this
scheme, upon receiving a token T , node A sends a TRD
request including T to β witness selected nodes using a
geographic routing scheme such as GPSR [65]. Since the
results of Scheme 2 are unsatisfactory, they have proposed
a Randomized Mapping Plus (called Scheme 3), which
allows each node within the transmission range of its
forwarding path and thus can overhear the TRD request
sent by node A, to return a TR alarm to A if it stores
T . Compared with Scheme 2, the TRD probability of
Scheme 3 is improved significantly for the same β without
additional storage cost.
However, with regard to both Scheme 2 and Scheme
3, there is a tradeoff between the TRD probability and
storage overhead as well as communication overhead.
The larger the β, the higher the TDR probability and
the larger storage and communication overhead. Thus,
they have further proposed a Double Ruling (DR) scheme
without the aforementioned limitations (called Scheme 4),
which is motivated by the DR [66] techniques. The basic
idea of DR is storing the sensed data along a continuous
curve, called replication curve that follows the horizontal
line, instead of storing data replication in one or several
isolated nodes. As regards network users, they query data
along the other continuous curve (called query curve) that
follows a vertical line. The data can be retrieved if the two
curves intersect. Let us consider a simple case. Assume
the network is a two-dimensional grid (see Fig. 6). The
token storage curves follow the horizontal lines (red/dark
line). The TRD request travels alone the query curves
that follow the vertical lines (blue/gray line). Suppose that
Alice wants to reuse token T at node A. Upon receiving
T , node A sends a TRD request traveling alone the blue
line in both up and down directions. When the query curve
hits the replication curve, the intersect node can send a
TR alarm to node A. Consequently, Alice fails to reuse
token T .
F. Location Privacy
Since WSNs are usually deployed in unattended areas,
location privacy is an important issue. Location privacy in
MWSNs may be classified into two categories: location
privacy of sensor nodes (e.g., data source) and location
privacy of mobile sinks.
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TRD query curve
token storage curve
A
Figure 6. A simple double ruling scheme on a grid.
For location privacy of a data source, consider, for
example, “Panda Hunter Game”, where a WSN consists
of a large number of Panda-detecting-sensors deployed
in a panda habitat [28]. If a sensor detects panda activity,
it generates a message and sends this message towards
the based station. Meanwhile, due to the open nature of
WSNs, an armed panda hunter may listen in and trace
location of the sensor that generates the message of panda
location.
Compared with location privacy of data source, location
privacy of a mobile sink is more important. Imagine a
MWSN deployed in unattended areas, such as a battle-
field, where the mobile sink is carried by a soldier or a
tank in order that they can access or retrieve sensed data
to analyze activities of enemies or movement of troops. If
the location of the mobile sink is exposed to the adversary,
the soldier or tank will be in great danger. Moreover,
since a mobile sink always holds authentication keys and
pairwise keys of the network, the entire MWSN becomes
useless if the mobile sink is destroyed or controlled by
an adversary.
In existing literature, there are several ways to trace the
location of data source and mobile sink. Here, we present
two main approaches. Since both data source and mobile
sink need to receive messages, an adversary can trace the
location of a data source or mobile sink by analyzing
the traffic rate. This traffic-analysis attack is introduced
and studied in [67], based on the basic observation that
near-sink nodes forward more packets than the sensors
further away from the sink. By analyzing the packets sent
at various locations in the network, an adversary is able
to compute the traffic rates (intensities) at these locations,
and then estimates the direction of the sink (the denser
it is, the closer to the sink). Another type of attack is
that an adversary can trace the location of data source
or mobile sink by following the movement of packets.
This packet-tracing attack is first addressed in [28], where
the sender’s location privacy (instead of the receiver’s)
is considered. In this attack, by eavesdropping on the
traffic, the adversary is able to perform a hop-by-hop
trace toward the original data source. In the following
paragraphs, we discuss four existing defense measures
(flooding [28], Random walk [28], dummy injection [28],
[29], [68], and fake data source [30]) against these two
types of attacks.
1) Location Privacy of Data Source:
Baseline and probabilistic flooding [28]. The basic
idea of baseline flooding is that an intermediate node,
once it receives a message, broadcasts the message to all
its neighbors. As a consequence, all the sensors in the
network participate in forwarding messages so that it is
hard for an adversary to trace a transmission route back
to the data source. In probabilistic flooding, each sensor
forwards message it receives with a pre-specified prob-
ability, instead of all sensors participating in forwarding
messages. Compared with baseline flooding, probabilistic
flooding can save energy for the network.
Random walk [28]. Random walk, as its name suggests,
performs a few steps of random walk from data source to
protect the original one. If an adversary follows the path
of transmission back to the data source, it will only be
able to figure out the terminal node of random walk.
Dummy data injection. The basic idea of dummy data
injection is to perturb traffic by sending fake packets. As
a consequence, the traffic observed by adversary is added
with “noise” so that it is not easy to quickly identify
fake paths and eliminate them from consideration. In
[28], a simple scheme, called Short-lived Fake Source
Routing, was proposed to protect location privacy. Take
communication overhead and energy consumption into
account. On the one hand, the scheme enables each sensor
to send fake packets with a pre-determined probability. On
the other hand, upon receiving a fake packet, a sensor
just discards it to prevent from further sending it to
others. Although the scheme can perturb the local traffic
observed by adversary, it is ineffective when it meets a
global adversary that can monitor transmission rate of
each sensor node and thus identify the sensors that only
sends out dummy packets [29]. To solve the problem, one
scheme was proposed in [29] that injects dummy packets
globally and keeps the transmission of real packets the
same as dummy packets against global adversaries who
may monitor and analyze the traffic over the whole
network. The main idea of [29] is that sensors send out
network-wide dummy packets with intervals following
a special distribution, such as constant or probabilistic.
Thanks to the fact that sending packets follow a pre-
determined distribution, the transmission delay of real
packets can be reduced without allowing an adversary to
identify the real traffic. However, this benefit is achieved
at a cost of transmission power for sensors or in other
words shorter network lifetime.
Fake data source [30]. The basic idea of fake data
source is to use it to confuse an adversary so that real
data source can be protected. By specifying one or more
sensors to impersonate the behaviors of real data sources
(such as sending fake packets with the same interval or
distribution), more data sources exist in the network. The
more the fake data sources, the harder and slower the
adversary can identify the real data source. However,
the scheme may cause more energy consumption for the
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behavior impersonation.
2) Location Privacy of Mobile Sink:
Besides protecting location privacy of data source,
another important task is to protect location privacy of
the mobile sink. To the best of our knowledge, there is so
far no such literature addressing the topic of protecting
location privacy of a mobile sink. However, in order
to provide a clue and stimulate new research direction,
we review the existing approaches aimed at protecting
location privacy of a static sink or base station.
The main challenges for protecting the location of a
sink or base station can be divided into two types: First,
a local adversary may be able to deduce the parent-child
relationship according to the received and sent data at
each sensor following a certain interval. By analyzing
the traffic, the adversary is able to trace down to the
sink along the data transmission route. Second, a global
adversary is able to monitor all traffic transmitted in
a whole WSN so that the global adversary is able to
compute the transmission rate of each sensor node, and
thus can identify the location of the sink.
Location-Privacy Routing protocol (LPR): In [31], the
behavior of an adversary is defined, which trusts previous
packet movement trend more than the current eavesdrop-
ping trend. To defend against such an attack pattern, the
scheme enables sensors to select routing paths randomly
based on a pre-defined probability. More specifically, the
neighbors of each sensor are divided into two lists - closer
list and farther list - based on the hop account from the
base station. When a sensor forwards a packet, it selects
the next hop from the farther list with probability Pr,
and from the closer list with probability 1−Pr . Conse-
quently, various routing paths are produced, which in turn
drastically reduce the probability of successful analysis
by the adversary. In addition, the authors combine the
routing protocol with fake packet injection to minimize
the information that an adversary can deduce from the
eavesdropped packets about the direction towards the sink.
Controlling transmission rate: Since near-sink sensors
need to both generate and forward traffic and thus cause a
higher transmission rate (and thus cause a high transmis-
sion rate), the asymmetric traffic flow enables an global
adversary to find the sink. To defend against the attack,
ref. [32] has proposed a privacy-preserving technique to
keep the same transmission rate among all sensors by
controlling delay of real data.
G. Key Management
In this subsection, we review the existing approaches
to hiding the location of mobile sinks in order to prevent
mobile sinks from becoming compromised by adversaries.
Indeed, once a mobile sink is compromised, the granted
privileges to the mobile sink can be abused. On the
one hand, without suitable restrictions, a compromised
mobile sink will be able to collect data from sensors in
the entire network. Since commodity sensors are always
constrained by their memory sizes and have to delete the
data offloaded to the mobile sink, the data consequently
collected by the compromised mobile sink will be lost and
cannot be recollected. On the other hand, we may request
that mobile sink revoke or isolate a sensor if the sensor
is identified as compromised, in order to investigate an
abnormal area of a sensor network when we suspect that
some sensors in that area may be compromised. Again,
without appropriate restrictions, a compromised mobile
sink can easily revoke any sensors at will and freeze the
whole network by simply sending revocation messages.
The severe consequence of mobile compromised sinks can
also be foreseen in other applications. This consequence
exhibits the importance of restricting the privilege of
mobile sinks [33].
As discussed above, if a mobile sink is given too high
privileges, it will become as the target for attacks and
probably compromised. Therefore, security mechanisms
that can tolerate mobile sink compromises are needed. In
[33], extended in [34], the authors have first proposed
several efficient schemes to restrict the privilege of a
mobile sink without impeding its capability of carrying
out authorized operations for an assigned task. The basic
operation is that each mobile sink takes an authenticator
for each task it may enforce. To prevent the authenticator
from revealing information due to mobile sink compro-
mises, the privileges of the authenticator are restricted
by adding parameters, such as the starting time and the
ending time of a task, the type of a task and ID of the
mobile sink. Each sensor can authenticate the authentica-
tor of the mobile sink before performing the desired task.
Once the mobile sink is compromised, the compromised
authenticator can only use for the pre-specified interval
[stating time, ending time], for accessing the data related
to the pre-specified task. In addition, if the mobile sink
is compromised, the base station can use authenticated
broadcasts to revoke the authenticator, including the ID
of the mobile sink.
H. Intrusion Detection
In the subsection, we review the approaches on how
to reduce impact - even if a mobile sink is compromised
by an adversary. We introduce the manner of detecting
intrusion to sensors first. To compromise sensors, an
adversary might capture (e.g., remove) sensors from the
network, then re-programme them. Indeed, the adversary
might capture a sensor to compromise its secret key, or
to re-programme it with malicious code before being able
to launch various attacks such as generating bogus data
for confusing the analysis results based on the data, or
performing Sybil attack [69] where a single node illegit-
imately claims multiple identities stolen from previously
captured sensors. Thus, learning how to detect the sensor
capture as early as possible is an important step.
Due to the intrinsic features of MWSNs such as ab-
sence of a trusted third party, most existing schemes
which rely on a trusted third party are not suitable for
MWSNs. The authors in [35] have proposed a scheme
depending on cooperation of the honest sensors, without a
third party, to detect possible sensor captures. Particularly,
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when a(n) (honest) sensor meets other sensors located in
the network, it can gather meet time information about
the presence of the sensor it has met. The meet time
information can thereby be considered as evidence that
the sensor exists at the time. If the sensor sa does not
meet a sensor si for a pre-specified interval λ, sensor sa
will broadcast an alert message suspecting that the sensor
si is probably captured.
Sometimes, sensor sa would broadcast a false message
claiming that si is probably captured, while si is still
working properly in the network. Since the interval λ is
pre-specified, prolonging λ can reduce the probability of
false alert messages while at the same time prolong the
time to detect the sensor capture. Note that we want to
reduce the probability of false alert messages, and we also
want to detect the sensor capture as early as possible.
Thus, the tradeoff is between the probability of false alert
messages and the time to detect the sensor capture. To
solve the dilemma, a sensor cooperation-based scheme
was proposed [35]. With this scheme, two (honest) nodes
can exchange meet time information about other nodes
which they have met during the past interval, every time
when these two trusted nodes meet again. For example,
sensors sa and sb are responsible for tracking sets of
sensors Sa and Sb, respectively. They can exchange meet
time information of Sa∩Sb when they meet. If both sa and
sb are tracking a third sensor si, sa and sb can compare
the time when they last met si and update the time which
is more recent.
I. Intrusion Resilience
We now turn to the area of intrusion resilience in
MWSNs. It is worth mentioning that in this subsection
we regard intrusion resilience as that sensors exhibit
resistance to attacks by themselves, rather than the other
popular intrusion resilient approaches which rely on a
trusted third party.
In MWSN, while sensors may move according to
certain common mobility models (e.g., random walk)
within an interest area, the mobile adversary can just
occupy a certain area (we will hereafter call it “corruption
area”) and wait for sensors to come across there. Once a
sensor moves to the corruption area, the mobile adversary
can compromise its security. As a consequence, it is
difficult for the sensor to regain security, i.e., to obtain
intrusion-resilience. To solve this problem, the authors in
[37] proposed a sensor cooperation protocol that allows
compromised sensors to recover their secure state after
being compromised. In brief, sensors take advantage of
mobility and cooperation with peers to regain security
even after having been compromised by a read-only
adversary which aims to learn as much data as possible.
The basic idea of the sensor cooperation protocol (more
detailed information can be found in subsection V-A.) is
similar with [18], [19] that sensors receive contributions
from their neighbors and use those contributions, along
with its current secret state, to compute the next round
secret. To distinguish the states of sensors, the sensor
sets are divided into three distinct groups: red, yellow and
green, defined as follows:
• Red: the state of a sensor is red if it is currently
within the corruption area.
• Yellow: a sensor is yellow if it is not in the corruption
area anymore, but the mobile adversary still knows
its state (i.e., secret key).
• Green: a sensor is green if it has never visited the
corruption area, or it was red (or yellow), but is now
healed by the cooperation of its neighbors.
Let us give an example to explain how a sensor, say si,
in Yellow state can be transformed into Green. At round
r+1, si moves out of the corruption area, but its secret key
Kri is still known by the mobile adversary. For simplicity,
we assume that si only receives three contributions φr+1j ,
φr+1j+1 and φ
r+1
j+2 from three neighbors sj , sj+1 and sj+2.
Then si computes its new key using those contributions
along with its current key as
Kr+1i = H(Kri ||φr+1j ||φr+1j+1||φr+1j+2).
Thus, it is easy to conclude that the healing is success-
ful if at least one of the three contributions is unknown by
the mobile adversary that at least one of three neighbors
is green.
However, the adversary considered in [37] is static
and passive. It controls a fixed portion of the network
deployment area and compromises all sensors moving
within it. As a further step based on [37], the authors
in [38] investigate another envisaged scenario where an
active adversary exists. It is active in that it chooses the
portion of the deployment area to compromise at each
round and aim to compromise various sets of sensors per
round. Generally speaking, [38] is also based on sensor
collaborative protocol addressed in [37].
To summarize, in this section we have classified and
surveyed various security mechanisms proposed so far for
MWSNs. In the next section, we identify a few relevant
open questions for future research in this field.
VI. OPEN QUESTIONS
Although many facets of security issues have been
studied, there are still a number of open questions in
MWSNs which need to be addressed, as outlined below.
A. Long-lived MWSNs
Let us consider network topology of static sensors with
a mobile sink. In this type of MWSNs, while there is
no static sink available, a mobile sink visits the static
sensors with irregular and even unpredictable frequency.
Consequently, each sensor must accumulate sensed data
and have the ability to wait long enough until a specified
signal sent by the mobile sink to offload data onto it. Since
the memory size of sensor nodes is limited, no matter how
the data are compressed, the memory would be full after
certain phases. Thus the mobile sink has to access the
network to offload data at a reasonable interval. Other-
wise, newly collected data (or old data) would be lost.
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However, in realistic scenarios, the mobile sink may fail
to visit the UWSN as planed for any unpredictable reasons
(bad weather or blocked by adversaries). In addition, the
mobile sink may be specified to prolong visit time interval
for sending a mobile sink to hostile environments (or
unattended areas), something which is highly risky (or
costly). Hence, to develop secure, long-lived MWSNs, we
need to answer the following questions:
• How to diminish power consumption of security
mechanism as less as possible.
• How to compress sensed data in a more efficient
way?
• How to design power management scheme to pro-
long both battery lifetime and network lifetime?
B. SKC-based Distributed Data Access Control
As discussed in Subsection V-D, existing literature ad-
dressing distributed data access control policy of MWSNs
is based on PKC which is considered too expensive to
implement in commodity sensors. The authors in [25]
have proposed an SKC based distributed data storage and
retrieval scheme, where access control policy is provided
by sharing the symmetric key with authorized users based
on perturbed polynomials [57]. It has, however, not been
proven to be secure in [58]. Therefore how to design
an SKC-based distributed data access control scheme in
MWSNs remains another open question.
C. Protecting the Mobile Sink
As mentioned earlier, currently there is no literature
that addresses location privacy of mobile sink in MWSNs.
When a mobile sink visits the static sensors to collect
accumulated data, if the location of a mobile sink is
detected by an adversary, the adversary can easily capture
or destroy the mobile sink. Since a mobile sink usually
holds the network master key and has higher privilege
than sensors, once a mobile sink is compromised, secret
keys and privileges granted to it will be abused. The open
questions in this respect are:
• How to protect the location privacy of a mobile sink?
• How to avoid impersonating the behavior of a real
mobile sink in the event that it is captured (or
comprised) by an adversary?
• How to design the optimal travel route to collect
accumulated sensor data with least security risk to
the mobile sink?
VII. CONCLUSION
Different from conventional WSNs, MWSNs are char-
acteristic of dynamic topologies for both sensors and
mobile sinks and exhibit new vulnerability when security
is concerned. In this article, we present a comprehensive
survey on security challenges, threat models and exist-
ing security mechanisms in MWSNs. Through in-depth
studies on various aspects of security issues in MWSNs,
from requirements to solutions, we have not only given
a general picture on this emerging research area but
also outlined the state-of-the-art security mechanisms
proposed so far in MWSNs. Finally, to trigger further
interests in the research community towards this direction,
a few open questions are pointed out.
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